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I. Introduction
When an employer gives a pretextual reason for an employee’s
termination, that falsehood can help prove that the true reason
was discrimination.1 The dishonesty constitutes “affirmative
evidence of guilt.”2 The trier of fact may “infer the ultimate fact of
discrimination from the falsity of the employer’s explanation.”3
However, when an employer provides multiple reasons for firing
an employee, there has been a split of opinion whether the plaintiff
must disprove one or all of those reasons.4
In the past, a number of jurisdictions, including the Fifth
Circuit, required the plaintiff to disprove all the employer’s
reasons.5 For example, the Seventh Circuit once dismissed a
1. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 517 (1993) (“[P]roving
the employer’s reason false becomes part of . . . the greater enterprise of proving
that the real reason was intentional discrimination.”).
2. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)
(establishing that, in certain circumstances, the factfinder is entitled to consider
a party’s dishonesty about a material fact as affirmative evidence of guilt).
3. See id. (explaining that this inference is consistent with general
principles of evidence law); see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 511
(reasoning that it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer discrimination from
the employer’s falsehood).
4. Compare Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding
that plaintiffs must rebut each of the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory
reasons), and Wolf v. Buss (Am.), Inc., 77 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the plaintiff failed to show that all six reasons were pretextual), with Lipchitz v.
Raytheon Co., 751 N.E.2d 360, 372 (Mass. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff did not
have to disprove every reason articulated). This article focuses on termination.
However, the concepts addressed apply to other types of adverse employment
actions, such as failure to hire, failure to promote, and disadvantageous transfers.
5. See Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 233 (5th Cir.
2015) (requiring an employee to rebut each discrete reason proffered by the
employer); see also Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024–25 (11th Cir.
2000) (“If the plaintiff does not proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue
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discrimination claim because the plaintiff showed that only four of
the employer’s six reasons for its action were pretextual.6
Massachusetts took a different approach, requiring the
plaintiff to show that only one of the multiple reasons was
pretextual (a standard hereinafter called “partial pretext”).7 The
First Circuit sometimes accepts partial pretext, as when the court
found an inference of discrimination where the plaintiff
demonstrated the employer’s knowing falsity with respect to only
one of three explanations.8 On other occasions, the First Circuit
has adopted a hybrid analysis, accepting the “disprove-all-reasons”
test, but also appearing to permit plaintiffs to use partial pretext
if they assert that the employer relied on a mixture of lawful and
unlawful factors.9 However, a more rigid version of disprove-allreasons may be filtering into First Circuit decisions.10
of material fact regarding whether each of the defendant employer’s articulated
reasons is pretextual, the employer is entitled to summary judgment.”).
6. See Wolf, 77 F.3d at 934 (holding that the four issues the plaintiff raised
were not so intertwined as to call into doubt the employer’s two credible reasons
for termination).
7. See Lipchitz, 751 N.E.2d at 372.
[T]o meet her burden of proof that discrimination was the determinative cause of the
promotion decision, Lipchitz was not required to disprove every reason articulated by
the defendant or suggested in the evidence . . . She could meet her burden by
persuading the fact finder that it was more likely than not that at least one reason
was false.

8. See Joseph v. Lincare, Inc., 989 F.3d 147, 161 (1st Cir. 2021) (holding
that the plaintiff had enough evidence to survive summary judgment even though
they raised issue with only one of the three explanations).
9. See Sher v. U.S. Dep’t. of Veteran’s Affs., 488 F.3d 489, 507, 508 n.22 (1st
Cir. 2007) ("[W]hen an employer offers multiple legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for an adverse employment action, a plaintiff must offer evidence to
counter each reason," but this requirement does not apply when the plaintiff
pursues a "mixed motive" claim).
10. See Brandt v. Fitzpatrick, 957 F.3d 67, 76 (1st Cir. 2020) (implying that
pretext analysis applies when discrimination is the single "true reason" for the
employment decision); Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1177 (1st Cir.
1991) (finding a plaintiff unable to show inference of age discrimination where he
showed one of the employer's explanations to be pretextual, but could not so
challenge a different explanation); Katz v. Organogenesis, Inc., No. 17 Civ. 11595,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160462, at *22–24 (D. Mass. Sept. 20, 2019) (stating that
the plaintiff failed to rebut all three legitimate, nondiscriminatory justifications).
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The Supreme Court indicated that, in cases in which a
plaintiff alleges that the termination was based on a combination
of lawful and unlawful motives, the plaintiff may prove bias with
circumstantial evidence, including evidence of pretext.11 Such a
holding presupposes that the plaintiff need not show every reason
is pretext, because the plaintiff’s theory of the case acknowledges
that the employer actually acted, in part, on a lawful motive.12 In
contrast, according to the Eleventh Circuit, “pretext has no place
in [mixed motive] analysis.”13 One of these cases must be wrong.
The Supreme Court’s recent discussion of multiple motives in
Bostock v. Clayton County14 provides the tools to resolve this split
and compels rejection of disprove-all-reasons.15 Bostock held that
gender discrimination is actionable, even if the employer was
motivated by other legitimate reasons, so long as gender was a
but-for cause.16 A plaintiff need only show that the termination
was based “in part” on a discriminatory motive and need not show
that bias was the sole, or even the primary reason.17 Since
plaintiffs need only show that bias was “in part” the reason for
discharge, and can agree with employers that other lawful reasons
contributed, it would be absurd to require plaintiffs to disprove the

11. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99–100 (2003)
(acknowledging the utility of pretext evidence in discrimination cases).
12. See id. at 102 (stating that in a mixed-motive case, “a plaintiff need only
present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice”).
13. See Vinson v. Koch Foods of Ala., LLC, 735 F. App’x 978, 981 (11th Cir.
2018) (explaining that proof of pretext is inapplicable to a claim alleging a mixed
motive theory of liability).
14. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (an employer
violates the Title VII prohibition against sex discrimination when it fires an
individual for being homosexual or being a transgender person).
15. See id. at 1739 (2020) (explaining that the but-causation standard
applies to Title VII claims of sex discrimination).
16. See id. (“When it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the traditional butfor causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing
some other factor that contributed to the challenged employment decision.”).
17. See id. at 1741 (stating that an employer violates Title VII if it
intentionally relies "in part” on an individual employee’s sex when deciding to
terminate the employee).
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other reasons.18 Bostock’s recognition of multiple, independent,
but-for reasons for an employment action, and rejection of a sole or
primary reason standard, highlights in new ways the disfunctional nature of the disprove-all-reasons test.19
This Article discusses various errors and flaws in the disproveall-reasons standard.20 Simply put, when a plaintiff can show that
discrimination was one of the determinative reasons for an adverse
employment action, there is no longer a need to disprove the other
reasons.21 Social science confirms that bias is often expressed in
the presence of other, valid factors that contribute to a decision.22
When a plaintiff disproves one of the employer’s but-for excuses, a
jury should be permitted to infer that discrimination inhabits the
same causal space that the employer ascribed to its false
explanation.23 The jury is permitted to find that a false explanation
was offered to obscure the presence of discrimination, even if other
explanations are also offered.24
The requirement to disprove all the employer’s reasons is
tantamount to requiring the plaintiff to prove that discrimination
was the sole reason for discharge.25 Disprove-all-reasons requires
the plaintiff to eliminate every possible reason other than

18. See id. ("Often, events have multiple but-for causes").
19. See id. at 1739 ("[T]he plaintiff's sex need not be the sole or primary cause
of the employer's adverse action").
20. See infra Part V.
21. See infra Part V.
22. See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious
Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 747 (2005) (citing a study that demonstrates
that discrimination may occur in contexts where it can be justified as something
other than discrimination).
23. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993) (explaining
that after the employee satisfies the prima facie burden, the employer has the
burden to introduce evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion
that "there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the action").
24. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99–100 (2003)
(acknowledging that pretext evidence is useful in a mixed motive case, where the
plaintiff alleges that the employer acted based on a mixture of legitimate and
illegitimate factors).
25. See infra Part VII; see also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731,
1744 (2020) (stating that Title VII does not require a plaintiff to prove that sex be
the sole or primary cause of an adverse employment action).
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discrimination.26 Such a difficult standard is wholly inconsistent
with the plaintiff’s but-for burden and Bostock’s rejection of the
“sole reason” standard.27 The danger in imposing an overly strict
burden is that it facilitates discrimination.28
Because evidence of pretext is “affirmative evidence” of
intentional discrimination, that inference of discrimination does
not simply evaporate just because an employer alleges more than
one reason for its action.29 When a criminal defendant’s alibi is
disproved, the accused criminal is not saved from a negative
inference merely by articulating a second alibi that cannot be
directly impugned.30 Rather, the falsity of the first alibi could lead
a jury to reasonably doubt the second alibi.31 An employer’s
dizzying array of explanations should not negate the persuasive
effect of affirmative evidence of bias.32
Consequently, courts that use the disprove-all-reasons test
should be asked to re-evaluate their approach in light of Bostock.33
This Article posits that the plaintiff generally needs only to prove
26. See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3rd Cir. 1994) (requiring
plaintiffs to rebut each of the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons).
27. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–40 (rejecting sole cause, and stating that
but-for "can be a sweeping standard.").
28. See Robert J. Smith, The Title VII Pretext Question: Resolved in Light of
St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 70 IND. L. REV. 281, 299 (hypothesizing that a
heightened burden for proving pretext could “deter potential plaintiffs and
attorneys from pursuing a Title VII claim because of the inevitable increase in
costs of gathering additional circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory motive”);
Sherie L. Coons, Proving Disparate Treatment After St. Mary’s Honor Center v.
Hicks: Is Anything Left of McDonnell Douglas?, 19 IOWA J. CORP. L. 379, 411 (1994)
(criticizing Hicks decision to the extent that it "places an impossible burden on
the plaintiff (to disprove all possible reasons for the employer's actions)").
29. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147
(finding that a jury is able to consider a party’s dishonesty about a material fact
as affirmative evidence of guilt).
30. See Commonwealth v. Connors, 185 N.E.2d 629, 631 (Mass. 1962)
(finding that the defendant’s false alibi could lead a jury to doubt the veracity of
a second alibi).
31. See id. (same).
32. See Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 751 N.E.2d 360, 371–72 (Mass. 2001)
(stating that a plaintiff should not be required to disprove every reason if one of
the reasons was already disproven).
33. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (rejecting the solepurpose requirement in favor of a but-for standard of causation).
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that one of the employer’s multiple asserted reasons is
pretextual.34 In the meantime, to place themselves in the best
position to avoid that overly restrictive doctrine, plaintiffs in
disprove-all-reasons jurisdictions should clearly allege, either in
whole or in the alternative, that discrimination was one of a
number of but-for reasons.35
II. The “But For” Standard Applies to Certain AntiDiscrimination Laws
Federal and Massachusetts anti-discrimination laws prohibit
employers from firing employees “because of” gender and various
other factors.36 The “because of” standard embraces a “but-for”
analysis, i.e., plaintiffs must prove they would not have been fired
but-for their gender.37
In 1989, the Supreme Court, construing the “because of”
provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), recognized that
Title VII liability may be established where the employer was
motivated by a mix of legitimate and illegitimate factors.38 In 1991,
Title VII was amended to further recognize liability in cases
34. See infra Part V.
35. Sher v. U.S. Dep’t. of Veteran’s Affs., 488 F.3d 489, 507–08, n.22 (1st Cir.
2007) (showing that a proper pleading may avoid the requirement to disprove all
reasons).
36. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018) (prohibiting employers from
failing or refusing to hire or discharge any individual because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1) (2018)
(prohibiting age discrimination); see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § § 4(1) (2018)
(establishing state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religious creed, national origin, sex, gender identity, and sexual orientation). For
purposes of clarity, this article focuses on gender discrimination. However, the
principles discussed in this article apply to other types of discrimination subject
to the but-for causation standard.
37. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1731 (establishing a but-for standard for Title
VII); see, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (holding
that Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles
of but-for causation); Brunner v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 603 N.E.2d 206
(Mass. 1992) (requiring a but-for standard of causation for Massachusetts
anti-discrimination laws).
38. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (reasoning that Congress intended Title VII to condemn decisions based
on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives).
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involving mixed motives, where lawful factors were considered
along with unlawful factors.39 The amendment permits the
plaintiff to recover compensatory damages upon proof that
discrimination was a motivating factor, “even though other factors
also motivated the practice.”40
The amendment allows an employer to defend against the
claim for damages if it proves that it would have terminated the
plaintiff even if it had not considered the discriminatory factor.41
While the amendment embraced a burden-shifting approach, the
but-for standard continues to apply when a plaintiff seeks damages
under either sections 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) or 2(a)(1).42 The
addition of Section 2(m) did not signal an alteration of the but-for
burden under Section 2(a)(1).43
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bostock provides a
crucial update on the but-for standard.44 The test “directs us to
change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it
does, we have found a but-for cause.”45 Using this test, the Court
held that bias against those with same-sex attraction or
transgender status constitutes sex discrimination under Title

39. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2018) (establishing a burden shifting
framework for Title VII cases involving mixed motives).
40. See id. (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice.”).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2018) (providing that an employer can
avoid damages if it can demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in
the absence of the impermissible motivating factor). However, even if the
employer prevails in this burden, Title VII permits liability and a narrow set of
remedies if the plaintiff merely shows that discrimination was a nondeterminative consideration.
42. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African American-Owned Media, 140 S.
Ct. 1009, 1017 (2020); Brandt v. Fitzpatrick, 957 F.3d 67, 76 (1st Cir. 2020)
(stating that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) adopts but-for cause, although it can shift
the burden to the employer).
43. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1740 (2020) (“Still, because
nothing in our analysis depends on the motivating factor test, we focus on the
more traditional but-for causation standard that continues to afford a viable, if
no longer exclusive, path to relief under Title VII, § 2000e-2(a)(1).”).
44. See id. at 1739 (articulating "multiple but-for cause" standard).
45. See id (recognizing that but-for causation "can be a sweeping standard").
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VII.46 For example, if an employer promotes a woman who wears a
dress, but fires a man who wears a dress, sex is a but-for factor,
even if a second factor, the wearing of a dress, also contributed.47
A but-for cause can be one of many causes that lead to a
particular result.48 “Often, events have multiple but-for causes.”49
If sex was one but-for cause of an employment decision, it is no
defense for an employer to identify some other, non-discriminatory
factor that also contributed to its decision.50 An employer violates
the law when it fires an employee based “in part” on sex, even “if
other factors besides the plaintiff’s sex contributed to the
decision.”51
Bostock illustrated the concept of multiple, independent butfor causes with the following example.52 Assume there are two
successful and competent employees—one male and one female,
and the employer intends to retain and promote both. Assume
further that the employer is a Red Sox fan, with a desire to fire
employees who follow the Yankees. If the employer terminates the
female employee because she is a woman and because she supports
the Yankees, but retains a male Yankees fan, that would constitute

46. See id. at 1741 (“[I]f changing the employee’s sex would have yielded a
different choice by the employer—a statutory violation has occurred.”); see also
id. at 1742 (noting that homosexuality and transgender status are related to sex,
so if an employer would not have terminated an employee but for that individual’s
sex, the statute’s causation standard is met).
47. See id. at 1742 (supporting the proposition that if an employer would not
have terminated an employee but for that individual’s sex, the statute’s causation
standard is met).
48. See id. at 1739 (explaining that a car accident might be caused both
because one driver failed to signal and because another ran a red light).
49. Id.
50. See id. at 1741 ("When it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the
traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability
just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment
decision").
51. Id. at 1741.
52. See id. (providing an example to support the notion that there is a
violation when an employer treats one employee worse because of that
individual's sex, even though "other factors may contribute to the decision").
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unlawful gender discrimination.53 That is so, even if the employer
would have retained the female had she been a Red Sox fan.54 The
plaintiff in this scenario need not prove that the employer’s bias
affected all women.55 In this way, there can be liability for gender
discrimination when an independent, lawful factor is also a but-for
consideration.56
Under Title VII and Chapter 151B, the plaintiff is not required
to prove that discrimination was the sole reason for discharge.57
“[T]he plaintiff’s sex need not be the sole or primary cause of the
employer’s adverse action.”58 Rather, there is liability when
forbidden bias is part of a mixture of causes.59
The multiple but-for’s standard is consistent with current
psychological models, which show that workplace bias often occurs
when non-discriminatory reasons justifying the decision are mixed

53. See id. at 1742 ("Carrying out that rule because an employee is a woman
and a fan of the Yankees is a firing 'because of sex' if the employer would have
tolerated the same allegiance in a male employee").
54. See id (illustrating an example in which multiple, independent but-for
causes constitute unlawful gender discrimination).
55. See id. at 1740–41, 1743 (reasoning that it is unlawful to subject an
individual to sex discrimination, even if the employer treats female employees
well, in general).
56. See id. at 1743 (noting that it is illegal for an employer to engage in a
practice of terminating women with young children while retaining men with
young children); see also id. at 1745 (explaining that where sex is one but-for
cause of an employer's action, it is illegal even if sex is not “the only factor, or
maybe even the main factor").
57. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10
(1976) (highlighting that under Title VII’s “because of” language, plaintiff need
only prove discrimination was “but for” cause as opposed to “sole” cause); see
Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 751 N.E. 2d 360, 371 n.19 (Mass. 2001) (explaining that
plaintiffs need not prove that discrimination sole cause of the action, but merely
the “but for” cause); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 n.7
(1989) (plurality) (stating that in Title VII, "the words “because of” do not mean
“‘solely because of’”“); see also Dartt v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 N.E. 2d 526,
531–33 (Mass. 1998) (rejecting a requirement that the plaintiff must prove at the
prima facie stage that he had been discriminated against “solely because of a
handicap”).
58. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1744 (2020).
59. See id. at 1742 (“[R]eframing the additional causes in today’s cases as
additional intentions can do no more to insulate the employers from liability.”).
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with bias.60 In one study, well-meaning study participants took
part in simulated job selection processes involving Black and white
candidates.61 Where the choice for the best candidate was clear, no
discrimination occurred.62 However, where the candidates’
qualifications were marginal, and a candidates’ non-selection could
be justified by legitimate criteria, Black candidates received
significantly weaker recommendations than similarly credentialed
white candidates.63 Discrimination occurred where choices were
difficult, and where valid criteria other than race were
considered.64 The study was conducted again ten years later, with
the same results.65
Enlightened courts have long recognized that discrimination
often occurs where legitimate considerations combine with
illegitimate ones.66 “Title VII meant to condemn even those
decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate

60. See Hart, supra note 22, at 746–47, 760 (2005) (“[M]any people who
explicitly support egalitarian principles and believe themselves to be nonprejudiced also unconsciously harbor negative feelings and beliefs about [B]lacks
and other historically disadvantaged groups”).
61. See id. at 748 (noting that the job candidates ranged along a spectrum
from unqualified to very qualified and included both Black and white applicants).
62. See id. (showing that the participants made unbiased choices when Black
candidates were either plainly qualified or plainly unqualified).
63. See id. at 748, 760–61 (observing that race became a factor in decisionmaking where candidates’ qualifications were marginal).
64. See id. at 748 ("But when these participants were presented with a
marginally qualified Black candidate, they gave that candidate significantly
weaker recommendations than they gave a comparably qualified white
candidate").
65. See id. at 748 (the study was conducted in 1989 and in 1999 with similar
results).
66. See Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 651–52 (4th Cir. 2017),
cert. denied sub nom. City of Greensboro v. BNT Advert. Agency, LLC, 138 S. Ct.
558, 651–52 (2017) (explaining that discrimination often takes place based on
nuanced decisions, in particular, factual contexts, which may be supported with
legitimate-sounding explanations, and that a biased employer will not necessarily
discriminate consistently against every woman under all circumstances).
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considerations.”67 Chapter 151B is the same.68 As will be shown,
the disprove-all-reasons test completely ignores the reality that
decisions are often based on the confluence of legal and illegal
motives. After Bostock, the disprove-all-reasons test should be
extinct.
III. Pretext is Circumstantial Evidence of Discrimination
While proof of pretext is not required in every case,69 it is a
type of circumstantial evidence that supports a finding of
discrimination.70 An employer’s explanation for a discharge is
pretextual if it was not the real reason.71 Pretext is established

67. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241, 252, 258 (1989)
(plurality) (finding that discrimination was properly identified even though the
plaintiff’s interpersonal problems were a legitimate concern).
68. See Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgmt. of the Trial Court v. Mass. Comm’n
Against Discrimination, 791 N.E.2d 316, 322 (“Even when nondiscriminatory
reasons play some role in a decision not to hire a particular applicant, that
decision may still be unlawful if discriminatory animus was a ‘material and
important’ ingredient’ in the decision-making calculus.”). But see Doull v. Foster,
163 N.E.3d 976, 988 (Mass. 2021) (noting that the SJC has rejected the
requirement of showing that a factor is a “material and important ingredient,” as
that overstates the but-for requirement).
69. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247, 257–58 (plurality) (showing that
pretext is not required in a mixed motives case, especially where an employer is
motivated out of stereotype, as there is no need to prove that the articulated
reason was untrue); see also Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227,
1240 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting that pretext is not required in mixed motive case);
see also Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A] plaintiff
who . . . claims that the employer acted with mixed motives is not required to
prove that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext.”); see also Abramian v.
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 731 N.E.2d 1075, 1086 (Mass. 2000) (“[T]he
plaintiff is not limited to the falsity of the employer’s articulated reasons in
proving discrimination.”).
70. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)
(proving that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is one form of
circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination).
71. See id. at 153 (noting that the district court correctly instructed the jury
that to show that the employer’s explanation was a pretext for discrimination, the
Plaintiff must demonstrate that the stated reasons were not the real reasons for
the discharge); see also Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 46 N.E.3d 24, 27 n.2
(permitting employees to prove discrimination by providing evidence that their
employers gave a “false reason” for a termination, which the court defines as "not

PRETEXT AFTER BOSTOCK

77

when the trier of fact disbelieves the reasons put forward by the
defendant.72 In other words, pretext is shown where “the
employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence,” or
where the evidence is sufficient “to reject the employer’s
explanation.”73 Even when a criticism of an employee is true,
pretext is established when it did not actual motivate the
termination.74
Circumstantial evidence is probative in discrimination cases,
and its persuasive value can be greater than direct evidence.75
Pretext can be “quite persuasive” circumstantial evidence, as it
constitutes “affirmative evidence of guilt.”76 “Resort to a pretextual
explanation is like flight from the scene of a crime, evidence
indicating consciousness of guilt, which is, of course, evidence of
illegal conduct.”77
Given that circumstantial evidence can support criminal
convictions, it is therefore more than adequate to sustain the lesser
burden borne by the plaintiff in a civil matter.78 And it is clear that
the real reason for terminating an individual's employment, regardless of
whether the false reason is factually accurate").
72. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 (“Proof that the defendant's explanation is
unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is
probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive.”).
73. Id. at 143, 149 (quoting Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine).
74. Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 673 n.2 (2016) (reasoning
that a factually accurate criticism of the plaintiff may not be the true reason for
discharge); Futrell v. J.I Case, 38 F.3d 342, 349 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[E]mployer's
proffered explanation for a discharge does not prevail simply because it contains
a true factual predicate").
75. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) (recognizing that
where a defendant’s explanation for an employment practice is “unworthy of
credence” is “one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional
discrimination”).
76. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)
(stating that a factfinder is entitled to consider a party’s dishonesty about
material facts as “affirmative evidence of guilt”).
77. Sheridan v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1069 (3d Cir.
1996).
78. See Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 100 ("The adequacy of circumstantial
evidence also extends beyond civil cases; we have never questioned the sufficiency
of circumstantial evidence in support of a criminal conviction, even though proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is required.").
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analogues to pretext evidence can help secure criminal convictions,
including evidence of consciousness of guilt, such as false
statements to police, a false alibi or providing a false identification
of oneself.79
Therefore, a “pretextual explanation naturally gives rise to an
inference of discriminatory intent.”80 Pretext gains further
evidentiary potency from the fact that the employer has exclusive
access to the reasons for discharge, and when those reasons are
untrue, its lack of veracity is highly suspicious.81
Pretext plays a central role in the McDonnell Douglas82
framework, which is commonly applied in discrimination cases
relying on circumstantial evidence.83 While the McDonnell
Douglas test is not the only way for plaintiffs to prove
discrimination,84 the framework allows plaintiffs to prove
discrimination by producing only a prima facie case and proof of
pretext.85 No direct evidence, or additional evidence linking the
termination to the plaintiff’s protected class status, is required.86
79. See Commonwealth v. Rojas, 447 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Mass. 1983) (“Added to
these facts are the defendant’s statements to the police that the jury could
reasonably infer were false, his flight, and his attempt to conceal his identity
when arrested in Florida.”).
80. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 484–85 (2008) (considering
discrimination in jury selection); see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 517 (1993) (noting that pretext “often considerably assists” a plaintiff in
supporting a discrimination claim); Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 99–100
(acknowledging the “utility” of pretext evidence).
81. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)
(“[O]nce the employer’s justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well
be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the
best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision.”).
82. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (stating
that the employee must be afforded a fair opportunity to show that the employer’s
stated reason for the employee's rejection was in fact pretext).
83. See id. (same).
84. Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2009) (declining to
analyze a disparate treatment claim using the McDonnell Douglas framework).
85. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146–47 (explaining that to show discrimination,
an employee may proffer a prima facie case and show that the employment
decision was pretextual); see Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 751 N.E.2d 360, 367–68
(Mass. 2001) (construing Massachusetts law, Chapter 151B).
86. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146–47; Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris,
Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 50 N.E.2d 778, 794 (Mass. 2016) (asserting that evidence
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Under McDonnell Douglas, the prima facie burden on the
plaintiff is not onerous.87 An example of a prima facie case is one
in which: (1) the plaintiff was in a protected class (e.g., female); (2)
was qualified; (3) was fired; and (4) was replaced. The prima facie
case is a “small showing,” and one “easily made.”88
After satisfying the prima facie requirement, the burden shifts
to the employer to articulate one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse action.89 If the employer
does so, the plaintiff must provide evidence showing that the
employer’s reason is pretextual and that discrimination occurred.90
However, the same evidence that shows pretext, can by itself,
demonstrate discrimination.91 “[T]he trier of fact can reasonably
infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is
dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.”92
To demonstrate discrimination, there is no requirement that
evidence of pretext be directly linked to the plaintiff’s protected

of pretext may prove discrimination, “even if that evidence does not show directly
that the true reasons were, in fact, discriminatory”).
87. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (“The
burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.”).
88. See Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 825 N.E.2d 522, 534 (Mass. 2005);
Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 2003); see Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (stating that the prima facie
burden does not equate to the ultimate burden of proof to demonstrate
discrimination); see Sch. Comm. of Boston v. Lab. Rels. Commn, 664 N.E.2d 455,
458 n.8 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (explaining that the prima facie case is established
when the evidence “barely preponderates toward a conclusion that discrimination
has occurred”) (internal citations omitted).
89. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (describing the burden of the employer).
90. See id. at 256 (“[T]he opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered
reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.”).
91. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)
(stating that the factfinder can infer intentional discrimination occurred).
92. Id.; see St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 n.4 (1993)
(explaining that once pretext is shown, no additional proof is required to raise a
reasonable inference of discrimination); Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d
38, 57–58 (1st Cir. 1999) (reasoning that the same evidence that shows that the
employer’s articulated reason is false may also satisfy the burden to show that a
true reason is discrimination); Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 751 N.E.2d 360, 367
(Mass. 2001) (explaining that proof of discrimination is not required beyond
showing pretext, even where evidence of pretext does not directly touch upon the
plaintiff’s protected class).

80

28 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 65 (2021)

characteristic.93 The persuasive power of pretext is not dependent
on whether it specifically focuses on discriminatory animus.94
Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated that “effective crossexamination of the defendant will suffice” to establish pretext.95

93. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 144–47 (explaining that pretext is shown where
plaintiff was blamed for things that were not his fault); Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin,
Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 50 N.E.2d 778, 794 (Mass. 2016) (reasoning
that evidence of pretext may prove discrimination, “even if that evidence does not
show directly that the true reasons were, in fact, discriminatory”); Thomas v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 57 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that that the district
court mischaracterized the need to show a connection between the pretext and
the plaintiff’s specific class); see Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 46 N.E.3d 24, 33
(Mass. 2016) (requiring proof of pretext to also show that the pretext conceals a
discriminatory purpose “overstates the plaintiff’s burden”).
94. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146, 149 (rejecting the lower court’s
determination that additional age-specific evidence was required, in addition to
proof of pretext);
Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of
circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be
quite persuasive . . . . In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably
infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up
a discriminatory purpose.

Id. at 147; see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)
(reasoning that a prima facie case and proof of pretext can support an inference
of discrimination).
95. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1981).
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Given that a modest prima facie case plus pretext are, by
themselves, generally sufficient to prove discrimination,96 it is
apparent that pretext is potent evidence of discrimination.97
IV. Split of Authority on Disprove-All-Reasons
Prior to Bostock and its description of multiple “but-for”
reasons, a substantial number of jurisdictions required employees
to disprove all the employer’s reasons before pretext evidence could
support an inference of discrimination.98 One case asserted that
sometimes when an employer offers “several independent reasons
for the challenged action . . . the employee must cast doubt
on each reason to overcome summary judgment.”99 Another case
asserted that “[w]here multiple reasons are advanced, the plaintiff
must show that each reason was a pretext.”100 Other jurisdictions
96. See Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 57–58 (1st Cir. 1999)
(finding that the district court mischaracterized the plaintiff’s burden when
requiring the plaintiff to submit evidence in addition to pretext); DeCaire v.
Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2008) (asserting that pretext, by itself, can be
sufficient to prove discrimination and it is erroneous for courts to require that
plaintiffs produce direct evidence to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas inquiry, which
was designed for cases lacking direct evidence); Rodriguez v. SmithKline
Beecham, 224 F.3d 1, 8 n.13 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that the district court erred
by imposing a pretext-plus standard); Lestage v. Coloplast Corp., 982 F.3d 37, 48
(1st Cir. 2020) (finding that liability was demonstrated based on a showing of
pretext); but see Casamento v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 550 F.3d 163, 165 (1st
Cir. 2008).
Nor does it furnish evidence of gender discrimination to assume (as the district judge
admittedly did) that the MBTA’s explanation could be regarded as
“pretext” if Schlueter were now occupying the posted job. Possibly in some contexts a
showing of a false explanation can add weight to a discrimination claim supported by
evidence; but it is hard to imagine such a case where there is no evidence of a
discriminatory motive in the first place; and, if an exception to this generalization
can possibly be imagined, it is certainly not this case.

97. See Thomas, 183 F.3d at 42 (reasoning that evidence of pretext can be
used to show discrimination).
98. See DeJesus v. WP Co., 841 F.3d 527, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (requiring
employees to disprove all of the employer’s reasons).
99. Id.
100. Big Apple Tire, Inc. v. Telesector Res. Grp., 476 F. Supp. 2d 314, 329
n.124 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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likewise required plaintiffs to disprove all the employer’s
reasons.101
In contrast, other courts allow plaintiffs to satisfy their burden
with proof that just one of the employer’s reasons is pretextual.102
The Eighth Circuit has stated:
[Plaintiff] must produce sufficient circumstantial evidence of
illegal discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas
paradigm—by presenting a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination plus sufficient evidence that one or more of the
[Defendant’s] proffered nondiscriminatory reasons is a pretext
for unlawful discrimination.103

Elsewhere, the Eighth Circuit has directly rejected the notion
that the plaintiff must rebut all of the employer’s reasons.104

101. See Kaufmann v. GMAC Mortg., 229 Fed. App’x 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2007)
(holding that the plaintiff must present evidence which suggests that each reason
offered by the employer for the adverse action “was a fabrication”); Monk v.
Potter, 723 F. Supp. 2d 860, 881 (E.D. Va. 2010) (stating that the plaintiff “must
instead meet each reason head on and rebut such reason”); Burton v. Freescale
Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 233 (5th Cir. 2015) (“An employee seeking to
show pretext must rebut each discrete reason proffered by the employer.”);
Idemudia v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 434 F. App’x 495, 505 n.7 (6th Cir. 2011) (“When
a defendant presents multiple legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the
[adverse]
action,
however,
the
plaintiff
must
demonstrate
that each independently
sufficient reason is
a pretext for
illegal
discrimination.”); Wolf v. Buss (Am.) Inc., 77 F.3d 914, 934 (7th Cir. 1996)
(“[Plaintiff] has ultimately failed to carry his burden of showing pretext because
the four reasons which he has successfully called into question are neither ‘so
intertwined,’ nor ‘so fishy’ as to call the remaining two reasons into doubt.”);
Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024–25 (11th Cir. 2000) (“If the plaintiff
does not proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether each of the defendant employer’s articulated reasons is
pretextual, the employer is entitled to summary judgment.”).
102. See Griffith v. Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736–37 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding
that a plaintiff need only prove that one of the reasons is pretextual).
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. See Strate v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., 398 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir.
2005) (rejecting the Bank’s argument that the employee must rebut every single
claim); EEOC v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 555 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[A] claimant need
not disprove all possible reasons for his discharge.”).
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In Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co.,105 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court recognized that the plaintiff need not prove that
discrimination was the “only” cause, stating that “[n]othing is the
result of a single cause in fact.”106 “The but-for test does not say
otherwise.”107 For that reason, the court concluded that the
plaintiff “was not required to disprove every reason articulated by
the defendant or suggested in the evidence.”108 The court went on
to clarify that a single pretextual reason is sufficient to surmount
the ultimate burden:
[Lipchitz] could meet her burden by persuading the fact finder
that it was more likely than not that at least one reason was
false. [citation omitted]. From such proof the fact finder could
infer that Raytheon’s discriminatory animus was the
determinative cause of the adverse employment decision.109

A substantial array of other cases reject disprove-allreasons.110 While the First Circuit has acknowledged that partial
105. See Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 751 N.E.2d 360, 372 (Mass. 2001) (holding
that the employee was not required to disprove every reason given by the
employer).
106. Id. at 371 n.19.
107. Id. (quoting D.B. Dobbs, Torts, § 168, at 410 (2001)).
108. Id. at 372.
109. Id. at 372 (emphasis added).
110. See Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1298–99 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(holding that where an objective reason has been shown to be pretextual, a jury
many then find that a subjective reason was pretextual); Holtz v. Rockefeller &
Co., 258 F.3d 62, 78, 81 (2d Cir. 2001).
To defeat summary judgment within the McDonnell Douglas framework, moreover,
the plaintiff is not required to show that the employer’s proffered reasons were false
or played no role in the employment decision, but only that they were not the only
reasons and that the prohibited factor was at least one of the motivating
factors . . . As noted, the plaintiff may instead rely on evidence—circumstantial or
otherwise—showing that ‘“an impermissible reason was ‘a motivating factor,’ without
proving that the employer’s proffered explanation” played no role in its conduct.

See also Naumovski v. Norris, 934 F.3d 200, 214 (2d Cir. 2019) (asserting that the
burden to prove pretext under McDonnell Douglas does not include the
requirement to show that discrimination was the exclusive reason); Asmo v.
Keane, Inc., 471 F.3d 588, 596 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that where an employer
argues that various factors, in combination, caused the discharge, the plaintiff
“need not show that all of the factors articulated by [the employer] are false but
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pretext may be used in cases alleging mixed motive, it has used
disprove-all-reasons when the plaintiff alleges that bias was the
employer’s sole motive.111
Still other cases reject disprove-all-reasons in particular
circumstances, such as when:
[1] the [employer’s] reasons are so intertwined that a showing
of pretext as to one raises doubts about the validity of another;
[2] the pretextual character of one reason is so “fishy” or
“suspicious” that a jury could find the employer lacks all
credibility; [3] the employer offers a plethora of reasons and the
plaintiff is able to challenge a substantial number of them; [4]
the plaintiff discredits the employer’s objective explanations,
leaving only subjective reasons; or [5] the employer failed to
argue that each factor would have independently resulted in the
termination. [internal citations omitted].112

However, after Bostock, even these nuanced approaches do not
go far enough. As will be shown, the best, most logical approach,
permits the plaintiff to succeed based on proof of a single pretext,
in conformity with the Griffin and Lipchitz cases.113

rather, only that some of the factors are false and a mere pretext for
discrimination”).
111. See Sher v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 488 F.3d at 507–08 n.22 (1st Cir.
2007) (explaining that Sher could have presented a mixed motive theory to avoid
having to disprove all the employer's reasons).
112. Jaramillo v. Colo. Jud. Dep’t, 427 F.3d 1303, 1310 (10th Cir. 2005) (“In
some cases, however, a successful attack on part of the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation is enough to survive summary judgment even if one
or more of the proffered reasons has not been discredited.”); see also Saley v.
Caney Fork, LLC, 886 F. Supp. 2d 837, 857 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (explaining that
the plaintiff does not have “to discredit every legitimate reason proffered by [the]
Defendant”).
113. See Griffith v. Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736–37 (8th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that proof that one or more of the employer's reasons is pretextual is
sufficient to prevail under the McDonnell Douglas paradigm); Lipchitz v.
Raytheon Co., 751 N.E.2d 360, 366 (2001) (holding that the plaintiff must only
show that “at least one of Raytheon’s reasons was false and from this it properly
could have inferred that she was not promoted because of unlawful
discrimination”).
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V. Disprove-All-Reasons Ignores the Persuasive Power of Pretext
Evidence
According to the disprove-all-reasons jurisdictions, the
probative value of pretext simply goes away if the employer merely
articulates a second reason. However, the probative value of
evidence does not just evaporate.114 That is like ignoring the fact
that a criminal defendant has lied about one alibi, so long as the
alleged criminal offers a second one.115 That would be an absurd
result in the criminal context but has become routine in
employment discrimination cases.116
The cases adopting disprove-all-reasons often ignore the
power of pretext to generate an inference of discrimination.117
Many cases stand for the idea that it is proper to conclude that
pretext is a cover for discrimination.118 And if pretext evidence is
“quite persuasive” and constitutes “affirmative evidence of
guilt,”119 then it should remain “quite persuasive” even when the
employer considered another factor.120 There is no good
explanation for why “affirmative evidence of guilt” vanishes with
the articulation of a second, third, or fourth reason.

114. See Michael J. Zimmer, Leading by Example: An Holistic Approach to
Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 179, 184
(2001) (explaining that the Fifth Circuit was incorrect when asserting that the
“plaintiff’s prima facie case loses all of its probative force once the defendant
introduces its rebuttal evidence”).
115. See Commonwealth v. Connors, 185 N.E.2d 629, 631 (Mass. 1962)
(finding that the defendant’s false alibi could lead a jury to doubt the veracity of
a second alibi).
116. Compare Connors, 185 N.E.2d at 631 (reasoning that a suspicion raised
by initial false alibi not dispelled with presentation of second alibi), with Katz v.
Organogenesis, Inc., No. 17-cv-11595-ADB, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 160462, at *22–
24 (D. Mass. Sept. 20, 2019) (reasoning that a plaintiff must disprove all the
employer’s reasons).
117. See Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 233 (5th Cir.
2015) ("An employee seeking to show pretext must rebut each discrete reason
proffered by the employer.").
118. See e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 484–86 (2008) (explaining
that pretext can lead to an inference of discrimination).
119. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000).
120. Id. at 147.
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“Disprove-all-reasons” is inconsistent with the nature of
circumstantial evidence, which is supposed to be reviewed, in its
totality, to determine whether it creates a “mosaic” that supports
the finding of bias.121 It is illogical and formulaic to hold that one
pretext cannot be part of that mosaic and cannot be considered
either alone or in tandem with other types of circumstantial
evidence, unless there is a blanket showing of pretext across all
explanations. The assertion that pretext evidence is probative only
when every reason is successfully challenged is a "per se rule,"
which is inappropriate for weighing the value of circumstantial
evidence.122
Moreover, when one or more of the employer’s assertions is
false, a jury might consider that falsehood to cast doubt on the
employer’s remaining assertions.123 The Third Circuit has stated:
We do not hold that, to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff
must cast doubt on each proffered reason in a vacuum. If the
defendant proffers a bagful of legitimate reasons, and the
plaintiff manages to cast substantial doubt on a fair number of
them, the plaintiff may not need to discredit the remainder. That
is because the factfinder’s rejection of some of the defendant’s
proffered reasons may impede the employer’s credibility
seriously enough so that a factfinder may rationally disbelieve
the remaining proffered reasons, even if no evidence
undermining those remaining rationales in particular is
available.124

The principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus—falsity in
one, falsity in all—should give the jury the option to disbelieve
121. See Burns v. Johnson, 829 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining the
mosaic approach).
122. See Sprint/United Mgmt. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S 379, 387–88 (2008)
(instructing the district court to avoid “per se” rules regarding the admissibility
of circumstantial evidence of bias).
123. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 n.7 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that
the employee, after showing one of the employer’s reasons is false, can show that
the employer’s other arguments should be doubted).
124. Id. (emphasis added); see also Bryant v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 432 F.3d
1114, 1126 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e recognize that when the plaintiff casts
substantial doubt on many of the employer’s multiple reasons, the jury could
reasonably find the employer lack credibility. Under those circumstances the jury
need not believe the employer’s remaining reasons.”) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).

PRETEXT AFTER BOSTOCK

87

other reasons.125 However, disprove-all-reasons assumes that a
jury has no basis for doubting reasons one and two, when they find
that reasons three, four and five untrue. Disprove-all-reasons
provides an employer incentive to offer a slew of nondiscriminatory reasons, with the hope that at least one percent of
those reasons cannot be challenged directly.126
When there is proof of pretext, it should be assumed that the
pretext, and the inferences it generates, replaces the causal “space”
of the disproved explanation.127 An employer articulates a reason
for discharge for the very purpose of asserting that the reason
made a difference in its decision.128 If that reason is shown to be
false, then, naturally, the pretext inhabits a difference-making
portion of the actual motive(s) for discharge.129 There is simply no
reason why partial pretext cannot be probative of
discrimination.130 Consequently, the showing of one pretext must
be assumed to support a finding that discrimination was a but-for
reason.131
125. See Logue v. Int’l Rehab. Assocs., 683 F. Supp. 518, 518 (W.D. Pa.
1988), aff’d mem., 866 F.2d 1410 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that the court can
follow the falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus approach in weighing evidence of
pretext).
126. See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1051 (11th Cir. 2000) (Birch,
J., concurring in part) (explaining the incentive structure this framework
creates).
127. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (“[The
plaintiff] now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason
was not the true reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges
with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination.”).
128. See id. at 255 (stating that after the prima facie case is established, the
employer must clearly set forth, supported by admissible evidence, its legitimate
business reasons for the adverse action).
129. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (indicating that
pretext evidence may be used in cases involving multiple motives, to demonstrate
that just one of those motives was discriminatory).
130. See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 855, 857 (9th Cir. 2002),
aff’d on other grounds, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (“Although McDonnell Douglas may be
used where a single motive is at issue . . . it also might be invoked in cases . . . in
which mixed motives are at issue.”).
131. See Logue v. Int’l Rehab. Assocs., 683 F. Supp. 518, 520 (W.D. Pa.
1988), aff’d mem., 866 F.2d 1410 (3d Cir. 1988) (“We therefore find that plaintiff’s
discharge was based on discrimination by reason of her sex.”).
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VI. Disprove-All-Reasons is Inconsistent with But-For Causation
The partial pretext test is justified by the principle that, under
the but-for standard, the plaintiff need not argue that
discrimination was the only reason for discharge.132 Indeed, the
plaintiff may even agree that the employer considered other valid
factors at the time.133 So, it makes no sense to require the plaintiff
to disprove a reason not in dispute.
Say, for example, an employer has a policy of terminating
employees after three unexcused absences. Assume further that an
employee was genuinely absent the first two times, but the
employer, motivated by sexism, manipulates the records to make
it appear that the employee was absent a third time. The employer
then fires the employee, claiming the employee was terminated
due to three absences. In this scenario, to show that the
termination was discriminatory under the but-for test, the
employee should be able to challenge only the third absence as
pretextual. However, under the disprove-all-reasons test, the
employee is required to show that all three absences were
pretextual. In this way, disprove-all-reasons is utterly inconsistent
with the but-for standard.
Bostock contemplates a situation where the plaintiff agrees
that one or more of the employer’s reasons was true, but the
termination was based in part on discrimination.134 Human
experience and social science demonstrate that multiple but-for
causes are commonplace. Disprove-all-reasons is directly
inconsistent with the idea that there may be a mixture of
legitimate and illegitimate reasons, and should therefore be
rejected.

132. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1744 (2020) (rejecting the
sole-cause standard).
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2018) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice
is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice.”).
134. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (explaining that a violation of Title VII
occurs when an "employer fires an individual in part because of sex.").
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VII. Disprove-All-Reasons Improperly Imposes a Sole Causation
Standard
The disprove-all-reasons approach requires the plaintiff to
prove that discrimination is the sole reason for discharge—a
standard never properly applied to Title VII or Chapter 151B.135
At the outset of a case, the employer has an infinite number of
potential reasons for the discharge.136 However, the plaintiff’s
prima facie case immediately challenges the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the employer’s action, including lack of
qualification, lack of competence and lack of job availability.137 In
response to the prima facie case, the employer must specify its
reasons, and support those reasons with evidence.138 Once the
employer responds, the McDonnell Douglas framework has
succeeded in reducing the number of potential reasons from
infinite to one or a few.139
Assume at this point that the employer has articulated three
reasons. If the plaintiff is required to disprove all three, the

135. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241, 252, 258 (plurality
opinion) (holding that discrimination was properly found even though the
plaintiff’s interpersonal problems were a legitimate concern); Chief Justice for
Admin. & Mgmt. of the Trial Ct. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 791
N.E.2d 316, 322 (Mass. 2003) (“[E]ven when nondiscriminatory reasons play some
role in a decision not to hire a particular applicant, that decision may still be
unlawful if discriminatory animus was a ‘material and important ingredient’ in
the decision-making calculus.”).
136. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973)
(“The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection. We need not attempt in
the instant case to detail every matter which fairly could be recognized as a
reasonable basis for a refusal to hire.”).
137. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (“The
prima facie case serves an important function in litigation: it eliminates the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection.”); Abramian v.
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 731 N.E.2d 1075, 1084 (Mass. 2000)
(explaining that the plaintiff's prima facie case eliminates "lack of competence
and lack of job availability" as reasons for the rejection).
138. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (explaining that the defendant must
produce evidence that it rejected the plaintiff based on a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason).
139. See id. at 255 n.8 (stating that the purpose of the McDonnell Douglas
framework is to "sharpen the inquiry").

90

28 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 65 (2021)

plaintiff is being required to eliminate every single one of the
employer’s infinite possible reasons, leaving discrimination as the
only reason remaining.140 Consequently, the disprove-all-reasons
standard is equivalent to the “sole” standard—an erroneously
burdensome requirement, given that the sole standard does not
apply to Title VII or Chapter 151B.141
Some jurisdictions that have accepted disprove-all-reasons
forthrightly refer to it as the standard for “single motive” cases.142
However, there is a profound inconsistency when a court requires
the plaintiff to surmount a “sole” motive standard, though the
statutory burden is much more lenient.143
The troubling implication here is that some circumstantial
evidence of bias (partial pretext) is deemed irrelevant in cases
involving but-for causation.144 The other side of the same troubling
coin is that the plaintiffs’ causation burden of proof becomes far
more onerous to the extent they seek to rely on pretext as
evidence.145 Such a situation is untenable, regardless of how the
issue is framed.146 As will be shown in the following section, the

140. Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 232 (5th Cir.
2015) (“An employee seeking to show pretext must rebut each discrete reason
proffered by the employee.”).
141. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1744 (2020) ("[T]he
plaintiff's sex need not be the sole or primary cause of the employer's adverse
action."); Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 751 N.E.2d 360, 371 n.19 (Mass. 2001) (stating
that discriminatory animus need not be "the only cause").
142. See Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir.
2016) (explaining that the McDonnell Douglas framework "is fatally inconsistent
with the mixed-motive theory of discrimination because the framework is
predicated on proof of a single, 'true reason' for the adverse action.").
143. See Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 211 (2014) (explaining that
under but-for standard, the unlawful reason need only be the “straw that broke
the camel’s back”).
144. Contra Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009) (“A
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (which may be direct or
circumstantial), that age was the ‘“but-for’” cause of the challenged employer
decision.”).
145. See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1049 (11th Cir. 2000) (Birch,
J., concurring in part) (explaining that requiring the plaintiff to show pretext for
all proffered reasons is illogical in some cases).
146. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct.
1009, 1014–15 (2020) (“[A] plaintiff bears the burden of showing that race was a
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Supreme Court has clearly rejected this cramped notion that
pretext is irrelevant to cases involving multiple motives.147
VIII. Disprove-All-Reasons is Contrary to Desert Palace
The disprove-all-reasons test is contrary to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.148 That case
examined the “motivating factor” amendment to Title VII, which
permits recovery of damages if unlawful bias was a “but-for” cause,
even if other lawful motives were also considered by the
employer.149 Under this amendment, the plaintiff has the initial
burden of proving that discrimination was a motivating factor in
the employer’s decision.150 In the underlying case, the plaintiff,
Costa, sought to satisfy the initial burden with circumstantial
evidence, including pretext evidence.151 The Supreme Court
accepted the case to determine whether the plaintiff was required
to use direct evidence to satisfy that initial burden.152
In resolving that question, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that circumstantial evidence is quite useful in discrimination cases
and then singled out pretext evidence as a type of “probative”
circumstantial evidence.153 The Court “recognized that evidence
that a defendant’s explanation for an employment practice is
‘unworthy of credence’’’ is ‘‘one form of circumstantial evidence that

but-for cause of its injury . . . [A]s a lawsuit progresses . . . the burden itself
remains constant.").
147. See generally Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
148. Id.
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2018).
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
151. See Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 96 (listing the evidence presented by
plaintiff).
152. See id. at 92 ("The question before us in this case is whether a plaintiff
must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive
instruction under Title VII"); Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227,
1236 n.5 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[D]irect evidence is evidence proving, without
inference, that illegal reasons motivated an adverse employment action.”).
153. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99–100 (2003) (“The reason
for treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and deep rooted:
‘Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain,
satisfying, and persuasive than direct evidence.’”).
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is probative of intentional discrimination.”154 The Court then
concluded that circumstantial evidence alone will satisfy the
plaintiff’s burden in mixed motive cases, because circumstantial
evidence is not only sufficient, but also it can be more persuasive
than direct evidence.155
Given that the Court in Desert Palace identified proof of
pretext as a type of probative circumstantial evidence, and further
announced that circumstantial evidence alone is adequate to prove
the existence of a discriminatory motivating factor, the
unavoidable implication is that partial pretext can be used and be
persuasive in cases where bias has combined with other, legitimate
motives.
IX. The Historical Case for Disprove-All-Reasons
Courts that apply the disprove-all-reasons standard generally
do so without explaining the reasons for the rule, and without
harmonizing the rule with the notion of but-for causation or the
holding of Desert Palace.156
Proponents of disprove-all-reasons claim to find support for
their position in Burdine’s description of the third (“pretext”) stage
of the McDonnell Douglas framework: that it provides the plaintiff
“an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.”157 This statement
at first blush appears to indicate that the plaintiff must prove
untrue all the “reasons” of the defendant.158

154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. See id. at 92, 100 (holding that direct evidence is not required).
156. See, e.g., Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 233 (5th
Cir. 2015) (failing to explain or justify the application of the disprove-all-reasons
rule).
157. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
158. See id. at 256 (“The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now
must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the
true reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with the
ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination.”).
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However, Burdine does not actually say that. Instead, Burdine
is merely describing the third stage as an occasion, an
“opportunity,” in which the plaintiff is invited to attack the
employer’s reasons.159 Burdine does not demand that all the
reasons be disproved, nor does it claim that partial pretext lacks
probative value.160
Moreover, the Burdine language was tailored to the situation
directly before it—where the plaintiff was alleging a single,
discriminatory motive.161 Thus, the Burdine Court did not have
cause to apply McDonnell Douglas to a case involving a mix of valid
and unlawful reasons, and did not purport to adopt a framework
for cases that could include such a combination. Indeed, even if
Burdine was describing a framework for a common scenario, that
does not mean that such framework applies to every case.162 This
dictum is weak fodder to support disprove-all-reasons, and after
Bostock, it is no fodder at all.
When explaining its adoption of disprove-all-reasons, the
Eleventh Circuit, in Quigg v. Thomas Cnty Sch. Dist., attempted
to distinguish cases involving a mixture of legal and illegal motives
from “single-motive” claims, in which the only motive is bias.163
Quigg then posited that the McDonnell Douglas framework, and
the Burdine pretext analysis, were developed in the “single-

159. Id.
160. See id. (pointing to the plaintiff’s “full and fair opportunity” to
demonstrate pretext).
161. See NLRB v. Transp. Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400 n.5 (1983)
(describing Burdine as involving the situation in which there are "either illegal
or legal motives, but not both."); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246–
47 (plurality opinion) (rejecting the Burdine framework for purposes of mixed
motive analysis, because Burdine addressed a single issue case, and was directed
to discovering whether the employer's articulated reason was "the true reason . . .
for the decision—which was the question asked by Burdine.").
162. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 n.6 (1976)
(noting that the McDonnell Douglas inquiry represents a flexible set of proofs,
and the fact that the Court has identified a version of the framework to be
applicable in a common scenario does not mean that such framework should be
applied to every other discrimination case).
163. Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1235–36, 1235 n.4
(11th Cir. 2016).
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motive” context.164 The Quigg decision goes on to state that
McDonnell Douglas is inapplicable to cases alleging a mixture of
motives, “because the [McDonnell Douglas] framework is
predicated on proof of a single, ‘true reason’ for an adverse
action.”165 The Court argued that McDonnell Douglas was designed
to narrow all the possible reasons down to a single discriminatory
one.166
The Eleventh Circuit then proceeded to associate singlemotive claims with the idea of proving pretext, further narrowing
the concept to the extent that pretext was said to be relevant only
when the plaintiff alleges bias as a single motive.167 “[S]inglemotive claims—which are also known as ‘“pretext’” claims—
require a showing that bias was the true reason for the adverse
action.”168 From this set of assumptions, the Eleventh Circuit
appears to conclude that as pretext is part of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis, and because the McDonnell Douglas analysis
applies to single-motive cases, that proof of pretext is irrelevant to
mixed-motive cases.169 Even worse, by this line of reasoning, to the
extent that a plaintiff introduces pretext evidence, it could be
deemed an admission that the plaintiff regards the case to be
alleging a single motive.

164. See id. at 1236–37 ("McDonnell Douglas is inappropriate for evaluating
mixed-motive claims").
165. See id. at 1237 (rejecting the McDonnell Douglas framework in mixed
motive cases).
166. See id (accepting the Sixth Circuit's analysis that "the McDonnell
Douglas approach is a single-motive framework – its burden-shifting steps are
designed to narrow the possible reasons for an adverse employment action, with
the goal of identifying whether discriminatory animus was 'the ultimate reason'
for the action.").
167. See id. at 1235 (explaining the distinction between single motive and
mixed motive claims).
168. Id. at 1235.
169. See id. at 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2016); see also Smith v. Vestavia Hills Bd.
of Educ., 791 Fed. Appx. 127, 130–31 (11th Cir. 2019) (stating that McDonnell
Douglas is only for single-motive claims and is not used for evaluating cases
involving mixed motives).

PRETEXT AFTER BOSTOCK

95

The assumptions underlying the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion
are incorrect. Pretext evidence is just as relevant to a mixed motive
case as it is to a single motive case.170
Moreover, it is simply not true that McDonnell Douglas was
developed for cases involving a single motive.171 “McDonnell
Douglas arose in a context where but-for causation was the
undisputed test.”172 McDonnell Douglas took a broad view of
causation, stating that “it is abundantly clear that Title VII
tolerates no . . . discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”173 It is
strange indeed that McDonnell Douglas, initially created to
address but-for, has instead been twisted into proving only sole
motive, which has never been a standard or requirement in Title
VII and is inconsistent with its own description of the reach of the
statute.
The case of McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.174
represents an early example of McDonnell Douglas being applied
where the employer considered both lawful and unlawful factors.175
In McDonald (which is a different case from McDonnell Douglas),
two white employees and one Black employee were charged with
stealing the employer’s antifreeze—a crime that the white
employees acknowledged.176 The white employees were fired but
the Black employee was retained.177 The white employees sued,
170. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99–100 (2003) (identifying
pretext evidence as a type of circumstantial evidence that is probative in
discrimination cases); Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735–36 (8th
Cir. 2004) (stating that pretext evidence may permit a jury to determine that
unlawful discrimination has occurred).
171. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973) (noting
that Green's termination occurred after Green took part in a "stall-in" designed
to tie up access to the employer's plant at a peak traffic hour).
172. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009,
1017 (2020).
173. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801 (stating that Congress requires
that barriers that promote discrimination be removed).
174. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
175. See id. at 282–83 (plaintiffs were fired after they stole materials from the
employer, but they may nevertheless seek damages for race discrimination).
176. See id. at 276 (noting that the white plaintiffs and Black comparator
were jointly charged with misappropriating 60 cans of antifreeze).
177. See id. (firing the two white employees but not firing a similarly situated
Black employee).
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alleging race discrimination.178 The case was dismissed by the
district court and that dismissal was affirmed by the court of
appeals, because there was “no allegation that the plaintiffs were
falsely charged.”179 At the Supreme Court, the employer argued
that it was entitled to fire the white employees due to their
crime.180 The employer argued that the McDonnell Douglas
framework was inapplicable, because there was no doubt that the
employer considered the plaintiffs’ participation in serious
misconduct.181 Indeed, the employer apparently did not terminate
all white employees—just the ones that stole—thus showing that
the crime was indeed a factor that was considered.
The Supreme Court found the situation to be
“indistinguishable from McDonnell Douglas,” and held that the
plaintiffs should have the opportunity to prove that the employer’s
reason was pretext.182 In defining “pretext,” the Court made it clear
that the notion of pretext does not mean that the plaintiff “must
show that he would have in any event been rejected or discharged
solely on the basis of his race, without regard to the alleged
deficiencies . . . . [N]o more is required to be shown that that race
was a ‘but for’ cause.”183 In other words, pretext may be used to
help prove a case of race discrimination, even though race was only
one of a number of but-for causes, and even if the employer also
considered or “regarded” legitimate factors other than race.184 The
Court wrote, “We cannot accept [the employer's] argument that the
178. See id. (alleging race discrimination when filing EEOC charges).
179. Id. at 279.
180. See id. at 281 (“Respondents contend that, even though generally
applicable to white persons, Title VII affords petitioners no protection in this case,
because their dismissal was based upon their commission of a serious criminal
offense against their employer.”).
181. See id. at 283 ("We cannot accept respondents' argument that the
principles of McDonnell Douglas are inapplicable where the discharge was based,
as petitioners' complaint admitted, on participation in serious misconduct or
crime directed against the employer.").
182. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 (1976)
(indicating that Title VII does not permit employers to use crime as a pretext for
racial discrimination).
183. Id. at 282 n.10 (emphasis added).
184. See id. (accepting that discriminatory conduct may take place in a
context which causes the employer legitimate, independent concern).

PRETEXT AFTER BOSTOCK

97

principles of McDonnell Douglas are inapplicable where the
discharge was based, as [the employee's] complaint admitted, on
participation in serious misconduct or crime directed against the
employer.”185 Quigg’s assumption that McDonnell Douglas and
pretext analysis were developed to apply only to single motive
cases is demonstrably false.186 Therefore, there does not seem to be
any strong, logical justification for disprove-all-reasons.187
X. The Prima Facie Case Has Probative Effect, Even Though It
Does Not Eliminate All Legitimate Reasons
The prima facie case is considered probative of bias, even
though it does not eliminate all of the employer’s reasons.188
Likewise, partial pretext should be considered as evidence,
although it does not directly eliminate all of the employer’s
reasons.
The prima facie case remains probative at McDonnell Douglas’
third stage, even though it tends to eliminate some, but not all of
the employer’s reasons.189 This leaves unanswered the perplexing
question of why a prima facie case is still considered valuable
evidence, while partial pretext is not, even though both eliminate
just some of the employer’s reasons.

185. See id. at 283.
186. Compare McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282–83,
n.10 (1976) with Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir.
2016) (asserting that the McDonnell Douglas framework is only appropriate for
use with single-motive claims).
187. See McDonald, 427 U.S. at 283 (“The Act prohibits all racial
discrimination in employment without exception for any group of particular
employees, and while crime or other misconduct may be a legitimate basis for
discharge, it is hardly one for racial discrimination.”).
188. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)
(reasoning that a prima facie case eliminates some, but not all nondiscriminatory
reasons for an adverse action).
189. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10 ("Nonetheless,
this [prima facie] evidence and inferences properly drawn therefrom may be
considered by the trier of fact on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation
is pretextual.").
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Some courts that utilize the disprove-all-reasons test find
support in the Supreme Court’s description of the probative value
of the prima facie case in Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters:190
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an
inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts,
if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the
consideration of impermissible factors. [citation omitted]. And
we are willing to presume this largely because we know from
our experience that more often than not people do not act in a
totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons,
especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate
reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as
possible reasons for the employer’s actions, it is more likely
than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with
some reason, based his decision on an impermissible
consideration.191

However, given that the prima facie case only partially
eliminates the employer’s reasons, the Furnco passage cannot be
considered to stand for the proposition that the only valid evidence
is that which eliminates every reason. Thus, the continued
relevance of the prima facie case at the third stage supports the
notion of partial pretext.
Furthermore, to the extent that the Furnco passage indicates
there is a necessity to eliminate “all legitimate reasons,” that
discussion is off-point, as the case did not consider but-for
causation, the consequences when an employer asserts multiple
reasons, or the adequacy of the partial-pretext evidence.192
Furnco’s statement is dicta because in that case, no pretext was
found, and so the court had no reason to address the validity of
partial pretext.193 The case’s off-point discussion is clearly
outdated in light of the holdings of Desert Palace and Bostock.194

190. 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (describing why the McDonnell Douglas
framework is probative of discrimination).
191. Id.
192. See id. at 577–78 (noting that "[pretext] evidence might take a variety of
forms.").
193. See id. (finding no pretext).
194. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (indicating that
pretext evidence may be used in support of a mixed motive claim); see Bostock v.
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XI. Plaintiffs Should Draft Their Pleadings to Embrace the
Concept of Mixed Motive
The First Circuit represents a hybrid position, adopting
disprove-all-reasons as a sort of default, but rejecting it if the
plaintiff asserts that their claim of discrimination involves a
mixture of legitimate and discriminatory factors.195 However, so
many courts are analyzing cases as single-motive, that they seem
to be presuming that plaintiffs are alleging a single motive, when
there is no reason why a plaintiff would voluntarily accept such a
high burden.
Plaintiffs seeking to insulate themselves from disprove-allreasons should specify in their pleadings that discrimination was
a but-for cause of their terminations, and that the employer may
have relied on other motives as well.196 Plaintiffs can expressly
indicate in their complaints the possibility that their terminations
may have been based on a mixture of unlawful and lawful
factors.197 Plaintiffs may also add a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(m), in addition to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), to
emphasize that they are alleging mixed motives.198 Those seeking
to studiously avoid the shifting burdens contemplated by Section
2(m) also have the option of including clarifying language in
motions, pretrial memoranda and proposed jury instructions.

Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1737 (2020) (stating that there may be multiple but-for
causes of an employment decision).
195. See Sher v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 488 F.3d 489, 507–08 n.22
(2007)(“[W]hen an employer offers multiple legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for an adverse employment action, a plaintiff generally must offer
evidence to counter each reason,” but applying this rule because the plaintiff
presented her claim as involving a single motive instead of mixed motives); see
also Kempf v. Hennepin Cnty., 987 F.3d 1192 (8th Cir. 2021) (adopting disproveall-reasons for the purposes of a particular case, because all parties agreed for
this to be the standard).
196. Cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 n.12 (1989) (stating
that there is no requirement to specify whether a claim is mixed motive in the
complaint).
197. See id. (same).
198. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018); see also Bostock v.
Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1740 (2020) (asserting that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) provide parallel remedies).
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XII. Conclusion

The law must be applied in a manner that serves its purpose
of prohibiting discrimination, even when legitimate factors also
contribute to an adverse action, as imposition of an overly strict
test facilitates discrimination.
There is a gross inconsistency between the requirement to
disprove-all-reasons, which represents a sole standard, and the
fact that Title VII is designed to impose liability where there is a
confluence of reasons, of which bias is only one. There is also an
absence of logic when pretext is understood to generate an
inference of unlawful motive and causation, but that inference is
held to vanish if the employer asserts just one more reason.
Likewise, the assumption that pretext analysis was developed
solely for single motive cases lacks sense, when Title VII has never
embraced the sole standard.
Partial pretext—proof of a single pretext—should be
considered potent circumstantial evidence because the inference of
discrimination inhabits the causal gap left by the false reason that
the employer asserted. Desert Palace invites plaintiffs to submit
evidence of pretext to support their mixed motives claims.199
Disprove-all-reasons is precisely the type of "per se" rule of
evidence that the Supreme Court has rejected.200 Given Bostock’s
recognition of multiple but-for motives, Courts should re-examine
and reject disprove-all-reasons.201

199. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99–100 (2003) (finding
direct evidence of discrimination is not required to prove employment
discrimination in mixed-motive cases under Title VII).
200. See Sprint/United Mgmt. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S 379, 387–88 (2008)
(stating that a "per se" rule limiting introduction of certain types of circumstantial
evidence of bias is improper).
201. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (stating that “often events have multiple
but-for causes”).

